

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 038854

56

ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

FRAF ED BY PM/NPO:LVNOSENZO/DS

APPROVED BY PM/NPO:LVNOSENZO

OES-MR. BENGELSDORF

S/P-MR. KALICKI

C-MR. KELLY

EUR/RPE-MR. WOLF

EUR/CE-MR. BEIGEL

ACDA-MR. VAN DOREN

S/S- MR. MOFFAT

----- 004978

O 181631Z FEB 76

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 038854

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, TECH, PK

SUBJECT: SENSITIVE FACILITIES FOR PAKISTAN

REFTEL: STATE 38095

1. AS REPORTED REFTEL, DECISION WAS REACHED OVER WEEKEND TO CALL IN PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR HERE TO URGE RECONSIDERATION OF PURCHASE OF REPROCESSING PLANT FROM FRANCE AND HEAVY WATER PLANT FROM FRG; FRANCE, FRG AND CANADA ARE TO BE NOTIFIED BEFOREHAND OF US CONCERN AND INFORMED OF OUR INTENT TO CALL IN PAKISTANIS. DEPART-

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 038854

MENT DISCUSSION WITH FRG EMBASSY REPORTED REFTEL.

2. PM DIRECTOR VEST CALLED IN FRENCH COUNSELOR
DE BELLESCIZE FEBRUARY 17 AND INFORMED HIM OF US
POSITION, DRAWING FROM FOLLOWING POINTS:

--WE HAVE IN PAST CONSULTATIONS DISCUSSED WITH FRENCH
OFFICIALS PROPOSED SALE OF PILOT REPROCESSING PLANT TO
PAKISTAN. WE UNDERSTAND THAT PROPOSED SAFEGUARDS AGREE-
MENT COVERING THIS PLANT HAS BEEN SUBMITTED FOR CON-
SIDERATION BY IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS LATER THIS MONTH.
IN THIS CONTEXT, WE WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT RECENT REVIEW
OF THE TOTALITY OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM HAS
HEIGHTENED OUR CONCERN THAT THE GOP MAY BE ATTEMPTING
TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY AS ADJUNCT TO
ITS POWER PROGRAM.

--WE INTEND TO APPROACH GOP SHORTLY TO INFORM THEM OF
OUR CONCERN, AND TO REQUEST THAT THEY RECONSIDER PURCHASE
OF REPROCESSING PLANT. WE WILL EXPRESS PARALLEL CONCERN
ON THE HEAVY WATER PLANT AND HAVE ALREADY INFORMED THE
FRG OF THIS.

--WE BELIEVE THAT ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTANI PROGRAM
MUST START FROM FACT THAT PAKISTAN HAS ONLY ONE SMALL
POWER REACTOR, THE CANADIAN-SUPPLIED KANUPP, AND NO
PROSPECT OF BRINGING LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM
INTO OPERATION FOR VERY LONG TIME (ALTHOUGH IT DOES ASPIRE
TO ACQUIRE AT LEAST ONE LWR IN THE NEAR TERM). IN THE
ABSENCE OF EITHER RESOURCES FOR OR COHERENT AND CREDIBLE
PLAN FOR SUBSTANTIALLY EXPANDING HER NUCLEAR REACTOR
PROGRAM, ACQUIRING SUPPORT FACILITIES OF SENSITIVE
CHARACTER DOES NOT APPEAR TO US TO HAVE ECONOMIC VALIDITY.

--EVEN ASSUMING THAT THEY ARE NEEDED TO SUPPORT FUTURE
REACTOR PROGRAM, THE MIX OF FACILITIES PAKISTAN SEEKS
ALSO STRIKES US AS LACKING SOME CREDIBILITY. PAKISTAN
IS AVOWEDLY DISSATISFIED WITH CANDU PLANT AND APPARENTLY
INTENDS TO BUILD ITS FUTURE PROGRAM AROUND LWR TECHNOLOGY,
FOR WHICH HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION AND CANDU FABRICATION
PLANTS ARE NOT SUITABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, REPROCESSING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 038854

IS NOT NEEDED IN HEAVY WATER FUEL CYCLE.

--THESE FACILITIES WOULD, MOREOVER, DUPLICATE ON
SMALL SCALE THE PROGRAM WHICH LED TO INDIA'S EXPLOSION.
IN CONJUNCTION WITH KANUPP REACTOR, THEY WOULD PROVIDE
BASIS FOR NARROWLY FOCUSED PROGRAM TO ACQUIRE EXPLOSIVE
OPTION.

--IT IS TRUE THAT ALL OF THESE FACILITIES WOULD BE SAFE-GUARDED. THE ECONOMIC COST OF WITHDRAWING FROM SAFE-GUARDS WOULD HOWEVER BE MINIMAL IN PAKISTAN'S CASE, AND POLITICAL AND SECURITY MOTIVATIONS TO COUNTER INDIA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY ARE HIGH.

--WE RECOGNIZE THAT YOUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH PAKISTAN ARE AT AN ADVANCED STAGE. NEVERTHELESS, WE SUGGEST THAT IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING YOU CONSIDER POSSIBILITY OF DEFERRING CONSIDERATION BY IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS UNTIL LATER MEETING. WE WOULD FRANKLY FIND OURSELVES IN DIFFICULT POSITION IF WE WERE ASKED TO APPROVE THIS AGREEMENT IN VIENNA, BECAUSE OF OUR SERIOUS CONCERNS AND OUR OPPOSITION TO SPREAD OF NATIONAL REPROCESSING FACILITIES PARTICULARLY WHERE HIGH RISKS OF PROLIFERATION ARE EVIDENT.

4. IN CONVERSATION, DE BELLESCIZE ASKED IF WE HAD ANY FIRM CORROBORATING EVIDENCE TO INDICATE PAKISTANI INTEREST IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS; VEST RESPONDED THAT IN FACT WE HAD SUCH EVIDENCE.

5. AS SEPARATE ACTION, VEST LATER CALLED DE NAZELLE TO CONVEY SUBSTANCE OF ABOVE TALKING POINTS. DE NAZELLE SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY BRIEFLY DISCUSSED QUESTION OF DEFERRAL OF IAEA BOARD ACTION ON FRENCH/PAKISTAN TRI-LATERAL WITH HIS MINISTER BUT NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN.

6. ON BOTH THIS ISSUE AND QUESTION OF SALE OF REPROCESSING PLANT TO PAKISTAN, DE NAZELLE SAID HE PERSONALLY UNDERSTOOD POSITION THE US WAS TAKING. HOWEVER, HE FRANKLY THOUGHT THAT FRENCH RESPONSE WOULD NOT BE POSITIVE. FROM
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 038854

FRENCH VIEWPOINT, THEY DO NOT SEE PAKISTAN SITUATION AS DELICATE AS KOREA AND HE THEREFORE DID NOT EXPECT SAME ATTITUDES AT HIGH LEVELS REGARDING THIS SALE AS IN THE CASE OF KOREA. SECONDLY, FOR OBVIOUS REASONS (BY WHICH HE OBVIOUSLY MEANT INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION) DE NAZELLE BELIEVED THAT FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO AGREE TO SECOND KOREA SO SOON AFTER THE FIRST. AS FINAL POINT, HE SAID THAT PAKISTANI PLANT, UNLIKE THE KOREAN PLANT, HAS BEEN UNDER NEGOTIATION SINCE 1972 AND HENCE FRENCH GOVERNMENT FEELS A MUCH GREATER COMMITMENT TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON SALE.

7. FOR THESE REASONS, DE NAZELLE SAID HE DID NOT THINK FRENCH WOULD AGREE TO EVEN DELAYING THE IAEA ACTION, RECOGNIZING THAT US WOULD HAVE TO TAKE AN UNHELPFUL

POSITION. HE SAID THEY WOULD GET BACK TO US IN DUE COURSE ON IAEA QUESTION.

8. AS RELATED ACTION, CANADIAN EMBASSY COUNSELOR NUTTING WAS ALSO INFORMED FEBRUARY 17 IN DETAIL BY DEPARTMENT (PM) OF INTENDED APPROACH TO PAKISTAN AND NOTIFICATION OF FRG AND FRANCE. NUTTING SAID THAT CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY APPROACHED PAKISTANIS, SUGGESTING DEFERRAL OF IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS CONSIDERATION OF TRILATERAL AGREEMENT COVERING REPROCESSING PLANT, AND CANADIAN EMBASSY PARIS HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE SIMILAR APPROACH TO GOF. NUTTING HAD PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TO DEPARTMENT THAT CANADA HAD FORMALLY INDICATED THEIR CONCERN TO FRENCH GOVERNMENT OVER REPROCESSING SALE AT TIME OF DELIVERING NOTE ON NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AGREEMENT (JANUARY 27).
INGERSOLL

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS, NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROGRAMS, HEAVY WATER
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 18 FEB 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: saccheem
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE038854
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760060-1085
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760238/aaaabgxq.tel
Line Count: 185
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: saccheem
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24 OCT 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <24 OCT 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <05 AUG 2004 by saccheem>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SENSITIVE FACILITIES FOR PAKISTAN
TAGS: PARM, TECH, PK, US
To: PARIS
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006